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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
logical conclusion is that eleemosynary educational institutions will no
longer be immune from liability.
The court, it seems, sees the availability of insurance as a panacea
for the suffering of those injured by accidents, and this without any
investigation by court or counsel as to the ability of religious institu-
tions in particular to finance insurance coverage. This writer questions
whether this type of decision reflects a trend in the law to minimize the
negligence factor in a move toward strict liability.
MARGARET M. HUFF
Municipal Immunity: Purchase of Liability Insurance by a
Municipality Waives Immunity-In the recent case of Marshall v. City
of Green Bay,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the city's pur-
chase of a liability policy in which the insurer renounced the defense of
governmental immunity constituted a waiver by the city of municipal
immunity for the tortious acts of its employees.
The action was brought by the injured wife and her husband and
involved injuries sustained by the wife while tobogganing on a toboggan
hill operated by the city outside of the corporate limits of Green Bay.
The injured wife was thrown from the toboggan when it hit a rough
area consisting of frozen hummocks. It was alleged that the city was
negligent in allowing the rough area to exist and in not warning users
of the hill of the danger.
Plaintiffs sued the city after disallowance of their claim by the
common council. The city carried insurance covering any liability for
its operation, supervision and maintenance of the toboggan hill. The
policy provided that the insurance company should be notified and should
defend any action on the policy at its own expense and could not claim
that the city was free from liability because of the performance of
governmental functions. It further provided that no action could be
brought against the insurer unless the amount of the city's obligation
to pay were first determined either by a judgment against the city after
trial or by a written agreement between the city, the claimant and the
insurer.
The city demurred to the complaint, and the trial court delayed
ruling on the demurrer to await the decision in the pending case of
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.2 After the Holytz decision which abol-
ished municipal immunity prospectively, the trial court sustained the
city's demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal plaintiffs con-
tended that their complaint stated a cause of action because:
(1) They were as diligent in pursuing their claims and in chal-
lenging governmental immunity as were the plaintiffs in Holytz
I Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W. 2d 715 (1963).
2 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).
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v. City of Milwaukee ... and should receive equal treatment,
(2) the reason for the prospective application of the abolition of
governmental immunity does not apply because the defendant
has liability insurance, (3) the maintenance and operation of the
toboggan hill outside of the corporate limits of the city was a
proprietary function and independent of the Holytz case the city
is liable for negligence, and (4) the defendant has waived its
immtinity by the purchase of insurance to the extent of the policy
limits and is estopped from asserting the defense of govern-
mental immunity.3
After deciding the first three contentions of the plaintiffs adversely,
the supreme court held that the plaintiffs' complaint did state a cause
of action against the city, because the city had purchased a liability
insurance policy with the provision therein that the company would not
raise the defense of immunity. The court said that it was deciding the
case as if Holytz had not been decided.
This decision overruled Pohland v. City of Sheboygan4 on the ques-
tion of whether the purchase of liability insurance with a provision that
the insurer would not raise the defense of immunity by a municipality
waives its immunity. In doing so, the court stated:
The power of a city to waive its tort immunity need not rest
upon any express grant of statutory authority. The immunity
granted municipalities from tort liability was created by case law
basically and primarily to protect public funds and property.
Such immunity can be waived by the municipality when it has
secured that purpose by insurance and believes a waiver to be
advantageous or desirable.5
The court specifically construed the clause in the insurance policy,
providing that the insurer would not raise the defense of governmental
immunity, to mean that the insurer, "... . who is in control of the de-
fense, will not raise such defense on behalf of the insured against the
claimant."5 In concluding its decision the court said:
We construe this agreement to be a waiver of governmental im-
munity by the city recognized and agreed to by the insurer. Such
immunity cannot be resuscitated by subsequent action of the city
or the insurer or both .... We do not hold, however, a munici-
pality waives its immunity when it takes out a liability policy
which does not contain the condition or agreement to refrain
from raising the defense of governmental immunity.7
There was a dissent in this case by Justice Gordon, who said:
In a proper case, the city might have chosen to waive its immu-
nity as a municipality performing a governmental function and,
3Marshall v. City of Green Bay, supra note 1, at 498, 118 N.W. 2d at 716.
4Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. 2d 136 (1947).
5 Marshall v. City of Green Bay, supra note 1, at 500, 118 N.W. 2d at 717.6 Id. at 501, 118 N.W. 2d at 718.
7 Id. at 501-502, 118 N.W. 2d at 718.
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in such event, its insurance coverage would be operative. The
fact, however, that it reserved the power to do this should not
be converted into a requirement that it do so. In my opinion
the majority decision unwisely translates the protection of insur-
ance to the creation of liability.'
Chief Justice Brown joined in the dissent.
This decision places Wisconsin among the growing number of
states holding a minority view on this issue.9 This view is more logical,
since a city would not bother to insure itself against a non-existent
risk."° If there were no risk to be insured against, a city might well be
liable for an unauthorized expenditure of public funds."
There is considerable vigor, however, in the majority view, that a
city does not waive its immunity by purchasing the type of liability
insurance policy purchased by the city in this case. 12 The following
reasons are given to support this view:
1. The mere fact that a municipality is authorized to procure liability
insurance does not warrant the conclusion that its immunity has been
removed.1
3
2. A municipality lacks power to waive its immunity or to estop
itself by procuring liability insurance.' 4
3. Liability insurance which is procured by a municipality entitled
to immunity from tort liability is insurance only against torts which
do not come within the scope of the immunity.' 5
The Marshall case approves a cause of action upon municipal torts
which occurred prior to July 15, 1962 (the prospective application date
of the Holytz decision) if the municipality being sued had in effect at
the time of the tortious conduct a liability policy providing that the
insurer would not raise the defense of governmental immunity. There
may be some additional value to this decision in its possible application
to suits commenced against charitable corporations which carry the type
of liability insurance discussed in this case for injuries arising prior
to the prospective application date of the Widell'0 case, which removed
the immunity of such corporations to liability for the negligent acts of
their employees.
Perhaps most importantly, however, this decision seems to give
further evidence of the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is pre-
s Id. at 503, 118 N.W. 2d at 719.
9 See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1959).
10 Lynwood v. Decatur Park District, 26 Ill. App. 2d 431, 168 N.E. 2d 185
(1960).
11 RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §15-4 (1957).
12 Annot., supra note 9.
13 Livingston v. Regents of New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic
Arts, 64 N.M. 306, 328 P. 2d 78 (1958).
14 Taylor v. State, 73 Nev. 151, 311 P. 2d 733 (1957).
15 Cushman v. Grafton County, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A. 2d 630 (1951).
10 Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W. 2d 249
(1963).
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pared to continue whittling away at immunities which no longer have
any real reason for their existence.
FREDERICK A. MUTH
Constitutional Law: Obscenity Censorship in Wisconsin-The
district attorney of Milwaukee county, acting under. statutory au-
thority,1 commenced action seeking to have Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer declared obscene. The challenged book, an autobiographical novel,
recounts the experiences of an American artist living in Paris during the
depression. A substantial portion of the narrative delineates in detail
through the use of vulgar language, sexual experiences of the author
and his associates. "References to the sexual episodes . . . are made
in short English words of ancient origin and wide, but not often printed
usage."' 2 Tropic of Cancer, nevertheless, has received considerable at-
tention as a serious literary work, and has been held to demonstrate
substantial writing ability.
The circuit court, after a trial without jury, concluded that "the
book is repugnant to decency and the moral standards of the commu-
nity, and has no literary, cultural, social or educational value. ' 3 On
appeal from this judgment the Wisconsin Supreme Court in a four to
three decision reversed the circuit court's finding of obscenity. 4
Justice Fairchild, writing the majority opinion, reiterates the
court's previous determination 5 that the word "obscene" in the Wis-
consin statute is the equivalent of the definition enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court and referred to as the Roth test.' The
test outlined was "whether to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." 7 "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance" were to enjoy full constitutional
protection.8
In light of these statements, the Wisconsin court concludes that
there can be no declaration of obscenity without consideration of such
factors as "the seriousness of the author's purpose, the social importance
of the idea expressed, or the artistic quality of expression."" A balancing
of factors is declared essential for a determination of the dominant
1 Wis. STAT. §269.565 (1961).
2 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 121 N.W. 2d 545, 551
(1963).3 Id. at 147, 121 N.W. 2d at 552.
4 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W. 2d 545 (1963).
5 State v. Chabot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 112, 106 N.W. 2d 286, 288 (1960).
6 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, supra note 4, at 138, 121 N.W. 2d at 547.
7Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
8 Id. at 484.
9 McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, supra note 4, at 142, 121 N.W. 2d at 549.
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